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INTRODUCTION
The events on June 22, 1999 leading up to the brutal killings of
Rebecca, Katheryn, and Leslie Gonzales in Castle Rock, Colorado
1
were undeniably shocking. Simon Gonzales abducted his three
daughters, ages seven, nine, and ten, violating a court-issued
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) that prohibited him from
2
“molest[ing] or disturb[ing]” his daughters and ex-wife. Jessica
Gonzales, the girls’ mother, called Castle Rock police six times to
report that Mr. Gonzales violated the TRO. Ms. Gonzales also
verified speaking with Mr. Gonzales and provided the police with the
1. The nine amicus briefs signed by one-hundred-thirteen organizations that
were filed on Ms. Gonzales’ behalf demonstrate the shock from the community. See
Brief of International Law Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04-278);
Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Ass’n of Women Lawyers and the National
Crime Victims Bar Ass’n in Support of Respondent, Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (No. 04278); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of
Respondent, Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (No. 04-278); Brief of National Black Police
Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (No.
04-278) [hereinafter NBPA Amicus Brief]; Brief Amici Curiae of National Network to
End Domestic Violence et al. in Support of Respondent, Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796
(No. 04-278) [hereinafter National Network Amicus Brief]; Brief Amicus Curiae of
AARP in Support of Respondent, Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (No. 04-278) [hereinafter
AARP Amicus Brief]; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Family Violence Prevention Fund et
al. in Support of Respondent, Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (No. 04-278); Brief of Peggy
Kerns, Former Member of the House of Representatives of the State of Colorado,
and the Texas Domestic Violence Direct Service Providers, as Amici Curiae In
Support of Respondent, Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (No. 04-278) [hereinafter Kerns
Amicus Brief]; Brief of National Coalition Against Domestic Violence and National
Center for Victims of Crime as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Gonzales, 125
S. Ct. 2796 (No. 04-278);
2. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 2004)
(attaching copies of the TRO issued against Mr. Gonzales on May 21, 1991 as an
appendix to the case); see also Colorado Judicial Branch, Common Legal Terms,
http://www.courts.state.co.us/chs/court/forms/commonterms.htm#T (last visited
July 20, 2006) (defining a TRO as “[a]n order granted without notice or hearing,
maintaining the status quo until a hearing to determine the propriety of injunctive
relief, temporary or permanent. In other states and in the federal courts this can be
referred to as a protective order”).
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girls’ likely location. Nevertheless, the police failed to respond to Ms.
Gonzales’ requests for enforcement of the TRO. Rather, they told
Ms. Gonzales six times to wait and call back later. Less than seven
hours after Ms. Gonzales first contacted police, Mr. Gonzales arrived
at the Castle Rock police station. He opened fire with a semiautomatic handgun he had purchased after taking the girls that day.
Police shot Mr. Gonzales dead at the scene and found the three
3
Gonzales girls dead in the cab of the truck. Mr. Gonzales had shot
4
each of his daughters in the head.
Ms. Gonzales sued the city of Castle Rock and three police officers
individually and on behalf of her daughters for violation of their due
5
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. District
Court of Colorado granted the city’s motion to dismiss on the basis
that the connection between the state’s actions and the harm to the
6
Gonzales girls was too remote to hold the state responsible. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the
city violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in
7
failing to protect the children by enforcing the TRO. The city

3. See Interview by Mike Wallace with Jessica Gonzales, CBS television broadcast
(Mar. 20, 2005), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/17/60
minutes/main681416.shtml (recounting what happened on the night Mr. Gonzales
abducted and killed his daughters). Castle Rock Chief of Police Tony Lane insists
that because there was no concrete evidence that Mr. Gonzales would act violently
against the girls, the police acted properly in treating the matter as a domestic
dispute. Id. He maintains that the officers acted reasonably based on the
information available to them at the time, and because Ms. Gonzales did not insist
that the police go to Mr. Gonzales’ known location. Id.
4. Id.
5. The Due Process Clause requires that no state shall “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 223, 233 (1863). Though Ms. Gonzales’ claim raised both substantive and
procedural due process rights, the U.S. District Court of Colorado dismissed her
substantive due process claim. The Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed
this dismissal. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005);
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1098. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc.
Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197–98 (1989) (refusing to uphold substantive due process
protection where doing so imposes an affirmative duty on state actors).
6. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, No. 00-D-1285, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26018,
at *15 (D. Colo. Jan. 22, 2001). The court acknowledged that its ruling was
troubling. However, quoting DeShaney, the court justified its decision because
[j]udges and lawyers, like other humans, are moved by natural sympathy in a
case like this to find a way for [the deceased children] and [their] mother to
receive adequate compensation for the grievous harm inflicted upon them.
But before yielding to that impulse, it is well to remember once again that
the harm was inflicted not by the [Defendants], but by [Simon Gonzales].
Id. at *15 (quoting 489 U.S. at 202-03) (alterations in original).
7. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1118.
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appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
8
whether Ms. Gonzales had a valid substantive due process claim.
On June 27, 2005, despite acknowledging the facts as “horrible,”
the Supreme Court held that the police did nothing wrong and that
Ms. Gonzales was not entitled to the enforcement of the TRO against
9
Mr. Gonzales. The Court classified TROs as “benefits” that are not
10
constitutionally protected entitlement property interests. The Court
explained that if state law required mandatory enforcement of TROs,
then an independent source would exist such that Ms. Gonzales
11
would have had an entitlement property interest.
However, the
Court quickly dismissed the possibility that mandatory enforcement
was the Colorado Legislature’s intent and provided Ms. Gonzales with
12
no basis for relief.
13
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales marks the latest in a line of
Supreme Court decisions limiting the protections of the procedural
14
due process clause. In DeShaney v. Winnebago, the Court indicated
that states can impose affirmative duties on their agents. In Gonzales,
the text of the statute and legislative history at issue show that the
Colorado Legislature intended to impose an affirmative duty on
15
police officers to enforce TROs. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
16
still refused to hold the Town of Castle Rock accountable. Rather,
8. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 533 U.S. 955 (2004) (granting the motion
for writ of certiorari).
9. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2810.
10. Id. at 2803.
11. Id. But cf. Siddle v. City of Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 509 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
(“This Court believes that [a protective] order creates a property right which incurs a
duty on the part of the government”); Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep’t, 739 F. Supp.
257, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“[A] court order may create a property right. If it did not,
much of the work of this, or any other court, would be nugatory; civil disputes are
referred to courts precisely because the court can issue an order that compels one
person to [act or not act].”).
12. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2805. Justices Stevens and Ginsberg also suggested that
interpretation of state law should be left to the Colorado Supreme Court. Transcript
of Oral Argument at 23-24, 51-52, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-278.pdf. See also Christopher J. Roederer,
Another Case in Lochner’s Legacy, The Court’s Assault on New Property: The Right to the
Mandatory Enforcement of a Restraining Order is a “Sham,” “Nullity,” and “Cruel Deception,”
54 DRAKE L. REV. 321, 338-41 (criticizing the Court’s failure to defer to the circuit
court which has local knowledge of law and practice, and which would be more
efficient).
13. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2805.
14. See 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (clarifying that a state can create affirmative
duties of care and protection on its agents judicially or legislatively). The DeShaney
Court, however, found no such duty existed to compel the state to protect a child
from violence inflicted by his father. Id.
15. See infra Part II.B (demonstrating the Colorado Legislature’s intent for
mandatory TRO enforcement).
16. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2803.
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the Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s finding that Colorado law gave
Ms. Gonzales a protected property interest in the enforcement of her
17
restraining order. As a result of this decision, the Court severely
restricted private citizens’ ability to receive relief when their negative
18
19
rights are infringed upon by state actors.
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court’s lack of deference
to clear legislative intent is best understood through the
rights/remedies framework. This framework explains how the
Court’s refusal to place any burden on state actors caused it to stray
from a textual interpretation of the Colorado Code that prescribed
mandatory TRO enforcement. This Comment proposes that this
shift is part of the Court’s expansion into remedies jurisprudence,
despite its proper role as an enforcer of rights. Part I begins by
explaining the rights/remedies framework. Part II analyzes the line
20
of Supreme Court cases from Goldberg v. Kelly to Gonzales,
demonstrating the Court’s shift to limiting the protections of the
procedural due process clause. Part III considers Gonzales’ impact on
public policy, as the decision diminishes legislative ability to protect
citizens while it expands the Supreme Court’s role to the application
of remedies. This Comment concludes by considering how the Court
should have ruled on Ms. Gonzales’ claim and the possibilities for
postdeprivation remedies for future victims.

17. Id. at 2804. The Court asserted that it placed greater weight on the plain
language of the statute than on legislative intent or on past Colorado court decisions.
However, the plain language of COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-805.5 does suggest
mandatory enforcement. See infra Part II.B.2 (showing the Colorado Legislature’s
intent for mandatory TRO enforcement through the plain language and legislative
history of the statute).
18. See Childs v. Collins, 995 F.2d 67, 69 (5th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that a
“negative right” is a shield against government intrusion); Arielle Goldhammer, A
Case Against Consensual Crimes: Why the Law Should Stay Out of Pocketbooks, Bedrooms,
and Medicine Cabinets, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 237, 237 (2002) (defining “negative rights” as
the “freedom from, rather than the freedom to do, something”).
19. Cf. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2805-06 (recognizing that “well established tradition
of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes”).
The Court also asserted that “legislative history, insufficient resources, and sheer
physical impossibility” supported non-mandatory interpretation. Id. But cf. Elaine
Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1229-32 (2001)
(explaining how taking away police discretion through “no drop” policies that
require police to arrest batterers may protect victims in the short term, but
disempowers them in the long term by removing decision-making power). See
generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 31 (2005) (contesting the understanding that the Constitution
prohibits the federal government from protecting citizens’ negative liberties).
20. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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THE RIGHTS/REMEDIES FRAMEWORK

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzales is best understood through
the rights/remedies framework.
This framework distinguishes
between cases in which the Court decides an issue based on a clear
constitutional or statutory right, and those in which the Court makes a
decision based on policy or political concerns arising from remedial
21
impacts.
Under the rights/remedies framework, courts bear the
responsibility for determining the extent and limit of legal rights,
while legislatures address the remedial concerns necessary to protect
22
these rights.
The historical basis for the rights/remedies framework begins with
23
Marbury v. Madison.
In Marbury, the Court established that the
Constitution gives courts final consideration of the constitutionality
24
25
More recently, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court
of laws.
reasserted the judiciary’s discretion to define what constitutes a right,
26
acknowledging the difference between rights and remedies. As the
court’s role is to define rights, the framework leaves remedial

21. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978) (suggesting that “there is an
important distinction between a statement which describes an ideal which is
embodied in the Constitution and a statement which attempts to translate such an
ideal into a workable standard for the decision of concrete issues”). Professor Sager
uses this distinction to explain the underenforcement of constitutional norms such
as the equal protection clause. He argues that in creating three standards of
scrutiny, and dismissing most claims of equal protection violations, the Court does
not fully provide the protections that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended. Id. at 1215-18.
22. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (emphasizing that the
Court’s role in interpreting the Constitution is to establish what the law says). See
generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting Congress legislative power to enforce
the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment).
23. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (explaining that legislative acts do not
bind the Court and that the Constitution gives the Supreme Court final
consideration of the constitutionality of laws).
24. Id. (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”). Justice Marshall also maintained that “[t]he question whether a
right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial
authority.” Id. at 167. Contra Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of
Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2707 (2003) (critiquing the widely-held belief that
judicial review was established by Marbury and instead pointing out that Marbury is
merely where the Court applied well-established principles).
25. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
26. Id. at 519. In Flores, the Court struck down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act because it did not agree with Congress’s interpretation of what was
constitutionally acceptable legal protection where the Constitution was silent. Id.; see
also David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and
Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 66-67 (1997)
(emphasizing how Flores is one example of the Court’s distinction between remedy
and substance).
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27

concerns to the legislatures.
Remedial concerns include the
implementation of judicially-determined constitutional rights and the
28
detection and prevention of constitutional violations.
In some cases, courts and legislatures may overstep their roles,
29
blurring these distinctions. For example, in Flores, the Court based
its decision on a constitutional right and found that Congress
overstepped its remedies role by enacting legislation that changed
the rights guaranteed under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
30
Amendment.
In contrast, the Court’s concern with remedial
31
impacts drove its decision in Colegrove v. Green. Colegrove involved a
challenge to congressional attempts to correct electoral districts for
federal elections pursuant to congressional powers under Article I,
32
Section 4 of the Constitution.
Professor Daryl J. Levinson has
suggested that the political controversy surrounding the
reapportionment and the lack of a feasible solution caused the Court
to “disclaim the existence of a judicially enforceable constitutional
33
right.”
Thus, concern over the outcome affected the Court’s
definition of a constitutional right.
Critics maintain that the framework’s distinction between rights
and remedies is oversimplified because rights are inherently
34
influenced by the nature of the remedies they create. Nevertheless,
27. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional
Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 87
(1997) (distinguishing rights as attaching to constitutionally-required affairs from
remedies, which attach to states of affairs that are not constitutionally required).
28. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857, 869 n.47 (1999) (defining “remedies” within this tool of constitutional
analysis).
29. 521 U.S. at 508.
30. Id. at 519 (striking down the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act); see also
Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretations: A Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 171-73 (1997) (asserting that the Court only has the
last say in interpreting the Constitution, and its proper role is to defer to Congress).
31. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
32. Id. at 552-53; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”).
33. Levinson, supra note 28, at 882 (explaining that the Court in Colegrove
allowed Congress to correct state malapportionment because of its justiciability
concerns, rather than constitutional concerns).
34. See, e.g., id. at 884 (asserting that courts must consider rights and remedies
concurrently because rights “may be shaped by the nature of the remed[ies] that will
follow if the right[s are] violated”). Levinson also argues that the threat of
undesirable remedial consequences forces courts to consider remedies alongside
rights, and that the definition of some rights necessarily incorporates remedies. Id.
at 885. Using the example of prison conditions, Levinson emphasizes the following:
The substantiation of the constitutional right to decent prison conditions
through the transformation of remedies into rights seems almost inevitable
in a setting where the constitutional right cannot be articulated in more
specific terms than “cruel and unusual,” and the only way to get a sense of

YUEN.OFFTOPRINTER

1850

8/12/2006 2:15:46 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1843

the rights/remedies framework is a helpful tool for understanding
judicial outcomes.
In particular, the framework offers one
explanation for the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales.
A. Support for Applying the Rights/Remedies Framework
Proponents for judicial application of the rights/remedies
framework assert that it properly balances the practical requirements
for naming and protecting rights with the constitutional roles of the
35
judiciary and legislature.
The judiciary’s insulation from public
opinion allows it to focus on determining what rights the
36
Constitution and statutes guarantee.
While this insulation from
shifting public opinion is the judiciary’s strength, it also makes courts
37
less capable of reflecting what the public wants. Thus, legislatures
are best situated to enact remedies and allow public opinion to
38
properly influence how states protect rights.
Moreover, the
framework properly accounts for the Constitution’s prohibition on
39
legislatures changing or expanding the rights.
which prison conditions are constitutionally forbidden is to see what kinds of
concrete changes are required by remedial orders.
Id. at 880.
35. See McConnell, supra note 30, at 163-65 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
emphasis in City of Boerne v. Flores on the legislature’s proper “remedial” role in
constitutional law).
36. E.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962) (defending the judicial branch as
necessary to democracy even though it sometimes overturns the will of the majority
as expressed by the actions of elected officials).
37. E.g., Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 52 (1979)
(contending that insulation of the judiciary equips it to “actualize” rights into
remedies). Fiss argues that “[A judge] must be impartial, distant, and detached from
the contestants, thereby increasing the likelihood that his decision will not be an
expression of the self-interest (or preferences) of the contestants, which is the
antithesis of the right or just decision.” Id. at 14; see also Lawrence Friedman, Public
Opinion and Strict Scrutiny Equal Protection Review: Higher Education Affirmative Action
and the Future of the Equal Protection Framework, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 267, 278-79
(2004) (arguing that the courts should never consider public opinion in making
decisions on equal protection matters, due in part to the difficulty of accurately
gauging public opinion).
38. See Fiss, supra note 37, at 51 (“The rightful place of the courts in our political
system turns on the existence of public values and on the promise of those
institutions—because they are independent and because they must engage in a
special dialogue—to articulate and elaborate the true meaning of those values”). But
see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (dismissing the argument that the Court can confine its
analysis to the mere words of the Constitution, but must take into account the “gloss
which life has written upon them”).
39. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (indicating that the
Court would strike down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act if it changed the
Constitution). The Court rejected the argument that it upheld past congressional
legislation that expanded constitutional rights. Id. at 527-28. Rather, it asserted that
Congress can only interpret the Constitution. Id. at 528.
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B. Assessing the Rights/Remedies Framework
Critics of the rights/remedies framework argue that it
oversimplifies the complicated manner in which courts properly
40
consider both rights and remedies.
Levinson argues that
“constitutional rights are inevitably shaped by, and incorporate,
41
remedial concerns.”
Therefore, it is unreasonable for courts to
consider rights in isolation, and it is impractical to assume that this is
what they actually do. Similarly, Professor Owen Fiss argues that
courts are not exclusively focused on recognizing rights when they
42
make decisions.
Rather, they also attempt to enforce remedies
43
addressing specific events. Therefore, Fiss asserts that the judiciary’s
purpose is to shape remedies because of its ongoing relationship with
44
the institutions in place to grant remedies. As such, critics conclude
that courts should consider the factual circumstances surrounding
45
their analysis of rights.
Despite these claims, the rights/remedies framework remains a
useful tool for understanding Gonzales. It provides an explanation for
why Justice Scalia, who advocates strongly that textualism is the
46
proper method for interpreting statutes and constitutions, argued
40. E.g., Levinson, supra note 28, at 873 (“remedying complex social pathologies
takes obvious precedence over enunciating interpretations of constitutional values”).
Levinson, however, does argue that the rights/remedies distinction might be more
properly applied over longer periods of time to understand the Court’s desire to
institute concrete change in public institutions. Id. at 874.
41. Id. at 873. Levinson asserts that “[r]ights are often shaped by the nature of
the remedy that will follow if the right is violated.” Id. at 874. He also describes
remedies as “a routine matter of making politically influenced policy judgments
about the means of achieving the constitutionally anointed ends.” Id. at 865.
42. Fiss, supra note 37, at 27.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 28. These “institutions,” such as schools, prisons, police departments,
and housing authorities, include both individuals and agencies. Id. at 29-30.
45. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978) (conceding that the Court
had to evaluate holistically the existence of Eighth Amendment violations in state
prisons).
46. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 22-23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (describing textualism as the belief that “[t]he
text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed”); see also Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (charging that the majority too
broadly construed the term “use” to achieve a desired outcome and preferring a
more restricted definition based on statutory language); Bradford C. Mank,
Textualism’s Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties,
Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 527 (1997-98)
(attributing the revival of the textualist approach to Justice Scalia). Justice Scalia
asserts that applying anything but the ordinary meaning of a word would “frustrate
the purpose of the statute,” and that “[s]tretching language in order to write a more
effective statute than Congress devised is not an exercise [the Court] should indulge
in.” Smith, 508 U.S. at 247 n.4; cf. BREYER, supra note 19, at 127 (contending that the
textualist or originalist methods are not more likely to produce clear, workable legal
rules than an approach that takes into consideration the intent of the legislature).
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against strict textual interpretation of section 18-6-805.5(3) of the
47
48
Colorado Code in the majority opinion of Gonzales. The Court’s
over-concern with the remedial impact of its decision explains its
dismissal of both the statute’s plain language and the Colorado
49
Legislature’s intent for mandatory TRO enforcement.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE RIGHTS/REMEDIES FRAMEWORK ON
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
The Supreme Court’s analysis of property entitlement interests in
Gonzales demonstrates its emphasis on remedies at the expense of
50
protecting rights.
The Court has defined property interests as
“individual entitlement[s] grounded in state law, which cannot be
51
removed except ‘for cause.’”
Further, the Court requires an
52
“independent source” for finding entitlement property interests.
The Court’s dismissal of the Tenth Circuit’s determination that the
Colorado Legislature did intend mandatory TRO enforcement
demonstrates its move away from a textual interpretation of rights to
53
a broader interpretation based on the impact of remedies. Because
of this shift, the Court found that Ms. Gonzales had no property
interest in the TRO’s enforcement and did not even consider the

47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-805.5(3) (1994).
48. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2804-09 (2005).
49. This judicial dismissal of legislative intent, especially absent any constitutional
violation, can be considered an abuse of judicial power. Justice Breyer encourages
public criticism and outcry to check such abuses. BREYER, supra note 19, at 127.
50. The Court did not consider whether the Constitution provides a basis for
requiring TRO enforcement because DeShaney v. Winnebago established that the
Constitution does not convert fundamental rights into affirmative duties by state
actors. 489 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1989); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (acknowledging that competent adults have a liberty
interest in refusing medical treatment, but holding that this interest does not
translate into an affirmative duty for the states to legally sanction physician-assisted
suicide).
51. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (citing Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972)). The Court goes on to explain that
property interests are not limited to tangible objects. Rather, “the types of interests
protected as ‘property’ are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating ‘to the
whole domain of social and economic fact.’” Id.
52. See infra Part II.A (presenting the history of the Supreme Court’s evolving
analysis for recognizing and protecting property interests).
53. In the early 1990s, many states, in addition to Colorado, passed statutes
raising standards for police response to domestic violence. Therefore, the Gonzales
decision reaches beyond Colorado and has implications throughout the United
States. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 455.080(3) (1992) (allowing law enforcement
agencies to establish specially-trained “domestic crisis teams” to respond to domestic
violence situations); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:25-20 (1992) (creating “domestic crisis
teams” and special training for officers responding to cases of domestic violence,
elder abuse, and neglect).
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procedural requirements that mandatory TRO enforcement would
create.
A. The Supreme Court’s Evolving Analysis for Protecting Property Interests
54

In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court expanded on the idea of property as
an “entitlement” and expressly rejected the argument that property is
55
a mere “gratuity.” In doing so, it found that welfare benefits are a
matter of “statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive
56
them.” Thus, the Court’s recognition of new property interests in
Goldberg opened the door for plaintiffs to sue the state for
57
infringement on those interests.
Nonetheless, because of its
concern with remedies, the Court has been increasingly reluctant to
recognize new property interests. A string of cases decided by the
Supreme Court in the ten years following Goldberg confirms this
58
trend.
The Court both affirmed and narrowed the Goldberg “entitlement”
59
test in Board of Regents v. Roth. By refusing to recognize a property
interest in continued employment, the Court narrowly limited
entitlement property interests to those “created and . . . defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
54. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
55. Id. at 263 n.8. The Court maintained that considering property as an
entitlement is “realistic” given that traditional common-law concepts of property no
longer fully account for actual wealth. Id.
56. Id. at 262.
57. See generally Michael Mattis, Protection Orders:
A Procedural Pacifier or a
Vigorously Enforced Protection Tool? A Discussion of The Tenth Circuit’s Decision in
Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 519, 527 (2005) (citing Breaden
Marshall Douthett, The Death of Constitutional Duty: The Court Reacts to the Expansion of
Section 1983 Liability in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 52 OHIO
ST. L.J. 643, 651-52 (1991) (characterizing the Court’s decision in Goldberg as starting
an “entitlement revolution”)).
58. See O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 784 (1980) (denying
that nursing home residents have a right to a hearing before the state revokes
funding for a nursing home facility and emphasizing the need to distinguish between
direct and indirect effects of governmental action to provide the legislature with the
ability to enact laws with merely tangential adverse effects); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 4104, 4130 (1978) (rejecting the argument that
appellants were deprived of a “property interest” in the airspace above their building
in light of the impact a decision to recognize a right in one’s future ability to exploit
a property interest would have on takings jurisprudence); see also Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976) (holding that no evidentiary hearing is required
when terminating social security disability benefits where sufficient protection is
provided by other procedures). The Court also expresses that procedural due
process theory does not absolutely guarantee citizens protection from deprivation of
life, liberty, or property. Id. at 334-35. Rather, procedural due process involves
balancing the affected private interests with the risk of erroneous deprivation
through procedures used, the value of alternative safeguards, and the government’s
interests. Id.
59. 408 U.S. 564, 564 (1972).
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60

such as state law.” This independent source requirement limits the
relief available to private citizens because it renders the Constitution
61
alone insufficient to create a property interest. Nevertheless, the
Court has found independent sources to grant property interests
62
when the entitlement becomes essential to the pursuit of livelihood
63
and where the private citizen depends on the benefit. The Court
has also found an independent source where a state statute included
64
mandatory language for the provision of a service.
Thus, even
where a service is not constitutionally guaranteed, the Court protects
it as a property interest when a state legislature guarantees its
65
provision.
In Gonzales, the Court acknowledged that if the Colorado
Legislature created a mandatory obligation for the police to enforce
66
restraining orders, Ms. Gonzales would prevail. Yet, despite clear
evidence of the Colorado Legislature’s intent for mandatory TRO
enforcement, the Court asserted that there is no mandatory

60. Id. at 577 (emphasis added). The Court further explained that one does not
have a property interest merely because of an “abstract need or desire for it.” Id.
61. Id.; accord DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (expounding
that courts and legislatures can impose affirmative duties on state actors when they
wish to do so).
62. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (recognizing an entitlement to
driver’s licenses because once issued, citizens depend on them for their livelihood).
63. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (establishing that “rules or
mutually explicit understandings” meet the requirements for a property interest even
where there is no “explicit contractual provision”).
64. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 586 (1975) (recognizing an entitlement to
public education where the state statute included mandatory language for the state
to provide public education).
65. E.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)
(allowing the government to terminate services once offered only “for cause”); In re
Jessup, 379 N.Y.S.2d 626, 632 (Fam. Ct. 1975) (citing to Goss and finding a property
interest in education once the state has started providing it); cf. San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (rejecting the argument that there is a
fundamental right to education); Brooke Wilkins, Comment, Should Public Education
be a Federal Fundamental Right?, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 261, 288-89 (2005) (arguing
for the Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental right to education in light of its
reasoning in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) that certain rights are a critical
part of the individual). Goss, heard just two years after Rodriguez, did not overturn
Rodriguez as the Court again asserted that there is no right to education. Rather, the
Court distinguished the cases by asserting that once the state begins providing a
service, it cannot arbitrarily stop the service. Goss, 419 U.S. at 586.
66. See 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2804 (2005) (clarifying that the main issue at bar is
determining “whether Colorado law gave respondent a right to police enforcement
of the restraining order”). The majority cites its prior opinion in Memphis Light, 436
U.S. at 9, requiring an “independent source” for a legitimate claim of entitlement as
the basis for focusing the opinion on the legislature’s intent. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at
2803-04; accord Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989)
(articulating that mandatory language is necessary to create a liberty interest).
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obligation attached to section 18-6-805.5(3).
Therefore, no
“independent source” and no protected property interest existed to
provide Ms. Gonzales with relief. Though Gonzales does not expressly
overturn the independent source requirement, the Court’s dismissal
of the statute’s plain language and legislative intent renders it
extremely difficult for legislatures to create a protected property
68
interest in the future.
The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that
section 18-6-805.5(3) requires mandatory TRO enforcement,
69
dismissing the statute’s plain language and legislative history. The
Court reached this conclusion despite precedent dictating that it
should defer to the lower court’s interpretation of state laws because
the lower court is better equipped to understand the laws of its own
70
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court asserted, “we think deference
71
inappropriate here,” and instead chose an interpretation in favor of
72
police discretion. The Court’s concern with remedies explains why

67. See infra Part II.D (applying the rights/remedies framework to explain the
Gonzales decision).
68. Cf. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1498, 1551-53 (1993) (recounting how legislatures enacted more mandatory
arrest legislation to protect the victims of domestic violence the year before the
Colorado Legislature enacted section 18-6-805.5). This article also predicts that the
states will face litigation regarding failure to protect victims, foreshadowing Gonzales.
Id. at 1557-60.
69. See Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2805 (“We do not believe that these provisions of
Colorado law truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.”). The
majority fails to address what the result would be if the Court were to find mandatory
intent. Instead, the majority argues that any amount of police discretion necessarily
negates mandatory enforcement. This, however, is contrary to the common police
understanding that they are required to provide assistance to victims, batterers, and
children, especially to “ensure the safety of children.” NBPA Amicus Brief, supra
note 1, at 9 (citing the INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, MODEL POLICY (rev. 1997)
(App. B 9a). Thus, police understand that though they have discretion to decide
what situations are serious and require action, this does not negate their duty to
respond when there are clear violations of restraining orders. The NBPA Amicus
Brief also notes that police officers understand their protective role in domestic
violence cases and that “reasonable means” would certainly include responding to
Ms. Gonzales’ repeated phone calls. Id.
70. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 n.9 (1985)
(reiterating that the Supreme Court should “defer to lower courts on state-law issues
unless there is ‘plain error’”); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S.
198, 205 (1956) (arguing that since the federal district judge was a member of the
jurisdiction’s bar, higher courts should show deference to his interpretation of that
jurisdiction’s law).
71. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2804.
72. Compare id. at 2806, with Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 62 n.32 (1999) (“It
is possible to read the mandatory language of the ordinance and conclude that it
affords police no discretion, since it speaks with the mandatory ‘shall.’”).
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it so easily overlooked the Colorado Legislature’s intent to provide
73
for mandatory enforcement.
B. The Colorado Legislature Intended Mandatory TRO Enforcement
The Colorado Legislature’s intentions when enacting section 18-6805.5(3) are best determined through analyzing the statute’s plain
language and legislative history. The plain language and legislative
history of section 18-6-805.5(3) of the Colorado Code demonstrate
74
the legislature’s intent for mandatory TRO enforcement. The use
of the term “shall” in section 18-6-805.5(3), as well as the judiciary’s
75
understanding of the term, signal this intent.
Furthermore, the
legislative history surrounding House Bill 1253 that became section
76
18-6-805.5(3) of the Colorado Code also points to mandatory intent.
Even if the plain meaning of the word “shall” leaves the police some
discretion, it does not negate a mandatory enforcement
77
requirement.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should have
recognized Ms. Gonzales’ entitlement property interest.
1. The plain meaning of “shall” signals mandatory intent
Section 18-6-803.5(3) of the Colorado Code states:
(a) Whenever a protection order is issued, the protected person
shall be provided with a copy of such order. A peace officer shall
use every reasonable means to enforce a protection order.
(b) A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical
under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a
restrained person when the peace office has information
amounting to probable cause that:

73. See infra Part II.D (offering the rights/remedies framework as a tool for
analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales). In addition, in his dissenting
opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, looked to the New Jersey
Superior Court and the Washington Court of Appeals that both found it permissible
to limit police discretion. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2813-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
also Roederer, supra note 19, at 341-55 (surveying Oregon, Tennessee, New Jersey,
and Washington statutes and state court determinations mandating mandatory
enforcement of protective orders). Roederer also provides a survey of state
legislation regarding police discretion to enforce protective orders. Id. at 365.
74. See generally G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic
Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237,
264-82 (2005) (tracing the development of mandatory enforcement statutes).
75. See infra Part II.B.1 (providing examples of how the Colorado Legislature, the
Colorado Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court have interpreted and used
the term “shall”).
76. See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the legislative history of section 18-6805.5(3)).
77. See infra Part II.B.3 (drawing upon the Supreme Court’s past analysis to
demonstrate how property interests can exist even if police retain some discretion).
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(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any
provision of a protection order; and
(II) The restrained person has been properly served with a copy of
the protection order or the restrained person has received actual
78
notice of the existence and substance of such order.

The Colorado Legislature uses “shall” more than twenty times in
section 18-6-803.5. The plain wording of the statute and the common
understanding of the word “shall” indicate that the legislature
79
intended the statute to be mandatory. For example, in People v.
80
Guenther, the Colorado Supreme Court plainly asserted that “[t]he
word ‘shall,’ when used in a statute, involves a ‘mandatory connotation’
81
and hence is the antithesis of discretion or choice.”
The Colorado
Supreme Court went on to declare that when the term “shall” is used,
82
only one interpretation is possible: mandatory application. The
court also noted that “[i]t must be presumed that the legislature has
knowledge of the legal import of the words it uses . . . and that it
83
intends each part of a statute to be given effect.”
Thus, the
Colorado Supreme Court clearly believes that the plain meaning of
84
“shall” requires mandatory enforcement. Since the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized that it has “no authority to
construe the language of a state statute more narrowly than the
78. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3) (2005). The statutory language of this
provision has not changed since it was amended and approved by the Colorado
Legislature on June 3, 1994.
79. See Kerns Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 8-9. Kerns rejects the notion that the
legislature intended any discretion, explaining that “the statute is plainly worded and
both the English language and the context indicate that ‘shall’ is intended to be a
mandate.” Id. at 8. Kerns concludes, on this first point, that “[t]here is no logical
reading of the statute that authorizes peace officers to do nothing.” Id. at 9.
80. 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1982).
81. Id. at 975 (emphasis added) (finding that the legislative intent of section 181-704.5(3) was to provide mandatory immunity for persons who use force when
defending their home); accord Swift v. Smith, 201 P.2d 609, 614 (Colo. 1949) (noting
that the word “shall” carries a presumptive interpretation of mandatory compliance);
People v. Dist. Court, Second Judicial Dist., 713 P.2d 918, 922 (Colo. 1986)
(explaining that while the term “may” is permissive, the terms “shall” and “require”
are mandatory).
82. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 976.
83. Id. (citation omitted).
84. Id. (stressing that since the legislature is “deliberate” and “calculated” when
drafting statutes, courts should defer to the “plain meaning of the words”); accord
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (“When a word is not defined by
statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”).
The Smith Court, however, also explained that “[l]anguage . . . cannot be interpreted
apart from context. The meaning of a word that appears ambiguous if viewed in
isolation may become clear when the word is analyzed in light of the terms that
surround it.” Id. at 229. But see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining “shall” as “[h]as a duty to; more broadly, is required to . . . the mandatory
sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically uphold,” but also
providing for alternative definitions of “should,” “may,” “will,” or “is entitled to”).
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construction given by that State’s highest court,” the Colorado
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term “shall” should have
86
prevailed.
Moreover, the Supreme Court itself found mandatory intent from
87
the word “shall” in Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson. In
Kentucky Department of Corrections, inmates challenged the Kentucky
prison system’s attempt to curtail their visitation rights on due
88
process grounds.
After examining the language of the relevant
statutes and regulations, the Court concluded that since the visitation
regulations provided that “[a] visitor may be denied a visit at any
89
time,” use of the term “may” negated mandatory action. However,
the Court went on to explain that the language of a subsequent
consent decree, which stated that “defendants shall continue their
open visiting policy,” required mandatory action on behalf of the
90
correctional authority. Even where the state has some discretion,
the Court found a constitutionally protected interest if there is
91
“explicitly mandatory language.” The Court broke with this line of
statutory interpretation in Gonzales, dismissing Ms. Gonzales’ claim to
an entitlement despite mandatory statutory language demanding
otherwise.

85. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 61 (1999).
86. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1980) (reaffirming that due process
protections are required once a state grants a liberty interest); Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (“[T]he sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided
by reference to state law.”). But see Morales, 527 U.S. at 62 n.32 (arguing that it “flies
in the face of common sense” to interpret a statute as prohibiting any police
discretion based solely on the fact that the statute “speaks with the mandatory
‘shall’”).
87. 490 U.S. 454 (1989). Accord Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935)
(clarifying that a statute’s use of the term “shall” is “more than directory words of
caution,” and is instead “the language of command”).
88. See id. at 457-58 (discussing the repeated denial of certain visitors which
spawned the inmates’ decision to organize a class action lawsuit).
89. Id. at 457 n.2.
90. Id. at 463 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983)). Other
jurisdictions also interpret “shall” as requiring mandatory intent. See, e.g., In re Bailey,
771 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1989) (asserting that interpreting “shall” to mean anything but
mandatory intent when used in a statute would be absurd); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Hammer, 236 S.W.2d 971, 973 (1951) (pronouncing that the general rule
of law is for “shall” to be construed as mandatory and not merely directory when
used in a statute or constitution).
91. E.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983) (concluding that even
though the state may not have intended to create a protected interest, one is created
when the state uses language that is “unmistakably mandatory [in] character,
requiring that certain procedures ‘shall,’ ‘will,’ or ‘must’ be employed”).
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2. The legislative history of section 18-6-803.5(3) signals mandatory intent
The legislative history of section 18-6-803.5(3) reveals that the
Colorado Legislature intended the statute to be mandatory. In Peggy
Kerns’ Amicus Brief on behalf of Ms. Gonzales, she explains that
“[t]his is a case about a state legislature’s policy choice to create an
entitlement to mandatory police enforcement of protection orders
92
for victims of domestic violence.” Kerns is the former Colorado
State Representative who sponsored the bill that became section 18-693
803.5(3), and her brief draws upon her first-hand knowledge to
explain the legislature’s intent to require vigorous enforcement of
94
protection orders. Kerns points out that the legislature granted an
exemption of liability to officers enforcing TROs because it preferred
to risk an erroneous arrest rather than risk harm to women and
95
children based on an officer’s decision to forego an arrest.
The Colorado Legislature placed “paramount importance” on both
96
the “issuance and enforcement of protection orders.” By increasing
accessibility to protection orders, the legislature sought to “promote
97
safety, reduce violence, and prevent serious harm and death.” The
legislation also recognized that the cost of domestic violence
98
outweighs the burden of mandatory enforcement. Kerns points to
the eight million days of work that domestic violence victims miss
92. Kerns Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
93. Id. at 1.
94. See id. at 3 (“Specifically tailored to resolve the problem of inconsistent police
response to protection order calls, the statute reflects a policy choice that the
reduction of family violence through consistent enforcement of protection orders is
a high priority to the people of Colorado.”).
95. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(5) (“A peace officer arresting a person for
violating a protection order or otherwise enforcing a protection order shall not be held
criminally or civilly liable for such arrest or enforcement unless the peace officer acts in
bad faith and with malice or does not act in compliance with rules adopted by the
Colorado supreme court.”) (emphasis added).
96. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102(1) (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id.; see Kerns Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 12-14 (underscoring that policy
concerns about the cost of domestic violence support the legislative intent for the
statute to be mandatory); accord National Center for Injury Prevention and Control,
Center for Disease Control, Intimate Partner Violence:
Fact Sheet (2005),
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/ factsheets/ipvfacts.htm (last visited July 20, 2006) (citing
a 2003 CDC study that explains that victims of severe intimate partner violence “lose
nearly 8 million days of paid work, the equivalent of more than 32,000 full-time
jobs—and almost 5.6 million days of household productivity each year”); Joseph S.
Volpe, Ph.D., B.C.E.T.S., The American Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress,
Effects of Domestic Violence on Children and Adolescents:
An Overview (1996),
http://www.aaets.org/arts/art8.htm (last visited July 20, 2006) (explaining that
without treatment, children who witness and experience domestic violence are “at
significant risk for delinquency, substance abuse, school drop-out, and difficulties in
their own relationships,” which creates concerns about the future economic and
social productivity of children who are impacted by domestic violence).
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each year, costing employers more than three billion dollars
99
annually. In addition, the more than 1,400,000 visits to emergency
rooms each year, along with the millions of dollars spent on shelters
for women and children fleeing domestic violence, represent
100
additional social costs of domestic violence.
Kerns concludes that
the legislature enacted section 18-6-803.5(3) in order to curb these
costs, and that ignoring the legislature’s intent to make enforcement
101
mandatory would defeat this purpose.
Furthermore, a comparison of section 18-6-803.5(3) with other
legislation enacted during the 1994 term supports a finding of
102
mandatory intent. In addition to requiring TRO enforcement, the
Colorado Legislature changed standardized TRO forms to create
103
more efficient procedures for obtaining a TRO.
The Legislature
also amended section 14-4-102 of the Colorado Code to eliminate the
requirement that protected parties show the protection order to the
104
officer who is enforcing it. This facilitates efficient enforcement as
police can more easily respond to reports of TRO violations.
During the 1994 term, the Colorado Legislature passed House Bill
105
94-1090 to create a statewide central registry for restraining orders.
The registry assists police in their enforcement of TROs by facilitating
easier access to restraining orders and faster response times to

99. Kerns Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 13.
100. Id. (noting that approximately fifty percent of homeless women and children
are fleeing domestic violence situations); cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
631-34 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (recounting the extensive domestic violence
statistics cited by Congress in support of the Violence Against Women Act). But cf.
id. at 626 (rejecting the argument that gender-motivated crimes of violence
constitute sufficient economic activity to justify congressional exercise of Commerce
Clause powers).
101. Kerns Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 14. In total, domestic violence costs the
United States more than $8.3 billion per year. Id.
102. H.B. 94-1090, 54th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1994), available at
http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/sl1994/sl.323.htm (last visited July 20,
2006); see also Melody Fuller & Janet Stansberry, 1994 Legislature Strengthens Domestic
Violence Protection Orders, 23 COLO. LAW. 2327 (1994) (providing an overview of the
1994 Colorado state legislation). Fuller and Stansberry argue that analysis of the
1994 legislation as a whole leads to the conclusion that the legislation was designed
to “strengthen both civil and criminal restraining order laws and procedures for
victims of domestic violence.” Id.
103. Id. at 2327. See generally COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1994 DIGEST OF BILLS
(54th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess.), available at http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/
olls/digest1994/CRIMINALLAWANDPROCEDURE.htm (last visited July 20, 2006)
(listing the criminal law and procedure amendments approved by the 54th General
Assembly of Colorado in 1994).
104. H.B. 94-1090, 54th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1994), available at
http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/sl1994/sl.323.htm (last visited July 20,
2006).
105. Id.
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106

reports of TRO violations.
Also, the Legislature increased the
punishment for protection order violations from Class Three
violations to Class Two misdemeanors, and charged repeat offenders
107
with Class One misdemeanors.
The increased punishments for
TRO violations demonstrate the Legislature’s desire to deter
violations. This, along with the Legislature’s attempt to create more
efficient procedures, supports the interpretation that section 18-6803.5(3) requires TRO enforcement rather than leaving enforcement
optional.
Finally, the Colorado state government itself advises victims that
police are required to respond when they have probable cause to
believe that a TRO has been violated. A brochure published by the
Colorado Judicial Branch after the deaths of the Gonzales girls states
that “[i]f the police have a ‘probable cause’ to believe that the
defendant has violated the restraining order, they are required to
108
arrest the defendant and take the defendant to jail.”
Thus,
Colorado does not allow the police to decide whether or not to
109
respond to a report of a restraining order violation. The language

106. House Bill 94-1090 is codified in Section 18-6-803.7(2)(a) of the Colorado
Code. Section 18-6-803.7(2)(a) provides that
“[t]here is hereby created in the bureau a computerized central registry of
protection orders which shall be accessible to any state law enforcement
agency or to any local law enforcement agency having a terminal which
communicates with the bureau. The central registry computers shall
communicate with computers operated by the state judicial department.”
See generally Fuller & Stansberry, supra note 102, at 2329 (noting that this repeal
specifically addressed officers’ hesitation to enforce restraining orders when the
protected party fails to show a copy of the protection order).
107. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(2)(a). Class One misdemeanors carry a
sentence of six to eighteen months in jail and/or a five hundred dollar to five
thousand dollar fine. Class Two misdemeanors require three months to one year of
jail time and/or a two hundred fifty dollar to one thousand dollar fine. Class Three
misdemeanors are punishable by six months in jail and/or a fifty dollar to seven
hundred and fifty dollar fine. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-501; see also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-1.3-401 (setting forth the punishments for Class One through Five felonies).
108. COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT COUNTY
COURT RESTRAINING ORDERS 5 (June 2002) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/pubed/brochures/restraining.pdf (last visited
July 20, 2006). Cf. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 94-95 (1975) (proposing
that even in light of full enforcement statutes and ordinances, police nonenforcement is legal and necessary).
However, Davis concedes that where
legislatures demonstrate specific intent for full enforcement, the general acceptance
for police non-enforcement of full enforcement statutes is diminished. Id. at 95.
109. Cf. Christopher J. Roederer, The Constitutionally Inspired Approaches to Police
Accountability for Violence Against Women in the U.S. and South Africa: Conservation
Versus Transformation, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 91, 109 (2005) (explaining that all
judicially recognized entitlements involve some level of discretion in
implementation). See generally Kevin Walsh, The Mandatory Arrest Law: Police Reaction,
16 PACE L. REV. 97, 101-03 (1995) (explaining why many states are moving towards
mandatory arrest statutes for domestic violence situations).
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of section 18-6-803.5(3) evinces a legislative determination that the
immediate danger to victims’ safety justifies mandatory police
110
action.
3. Even if police discretion remains, property interests can still exist
Even if section 18-6-803.5(3) of the Colorado Code affords police
some discretion, this does not automatically negate the existence of a
111
property interest. In Olim v. Wakinekona, the Supreme Court found
a property interest where police discretion was severely limited but
112
not entirely removed. As it may be practically impossible to remove
all discretion from police, discretion alone should not defeat the
113
existence of mandatory enforcement.
Since courts have found
property interests even where statutes clearly leave room for
114
discretion, it is unreasonable to interpret section 18-6-803.5(3) as
not mandating TRO enforcement simply because it may afford police
some discretion.
C. Ms. Gonzales’ Clear Expectation of the TRO’s Enforcement Supports
Finding a Protected Property Interest
115

In Barry v. Barchi, the Supreme Court recognized a property
interest even though it was unclear if the legislature intended to
116
create an independent source of entitlement. In Barchi, the Court
showed great deference to a New York state law that stated, “a license
110. See NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON POLICE RESPONSE
PROCEDURES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 11-12 (rev. Nov. 1994), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/dvpolrsp.htm (granting police discretion as
to whether or not to file charges, but requiring police to advise the victim that she
may sign and complete a criminal or civil complaint herself).
111. 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
112. See id. at 249 (distinguishing situations where official discretion is guided by
“objective and defined criteria” from situations in which officials may deny relief
based on “any constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all” (quoting
Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466-67 (1981)).
113. See DAVIS, supra note 108, at 144-45 (concluding that while it is necessary to
limit the discretion of police, it is impossible to eliminate absolutely all discretion);
cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 (1972) (invalidating a vagrancy law
because it afforded police unlimited discretion in enforcement).
114. See, e.g., Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476-77 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990) (upholding a Kentucky law creating an
entitlement for protective services for children in state custody); Siddle v.
Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 509 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (setting forth the principle that
police are required to act reasonably, and that they violate citizens’ rights when they
shirk their duty to protect); Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep’t, 739 F. Supp. 257, 263-66
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (acknowledging that while police work requires “a great deal of
discretion,” the plaintiff has a property interest in a reasonable police response).
115. 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
116. Id. at 65 n.11; accord Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 431 (1982) (finding
a property interest where the claimant had “more than an abstract desire or interest
in redressing his grievance”).
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may not be revoked or suspended at the discretion of the racing
117
The Court
authorities” absent proof of “certain contingencies.”
held that the New York State Racing and Wagering Board erred in
suspending the appellee horse trainer’s license because the
appellee’s “clear expectation of continued enjoyment of a license”
118
constituted a protected property interest.
In contrast, despite Ms. Gonzales’ clear expectation of continued
TRO enforcement, the Court refused to find that she had a property
119
interest.
In fact, given that the weight of the evidence supports
interpreting section 18-6-803.5(3) as creating mandatory TRO
120
enforcement,
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that Ms.
Gonzales’ relationship with Castle Rock police was the “functional
121
equivalent” of a private contract.
The majority of the Court,
however, failed to distinguish Ms. Gonzales’ expectation from the
expectation in Barchi. The Court simply set aside Barchi’s clear
expectation standard without explanation.
Ms. Gonzales repeatedly expressed a clear belief that she expected
122
Her belief was well-founded
the police to enforce the TRO.
because it reflects not only her reasonable understanding of TRO
enforcement, but also the common police understanding about the
123
appropriate response to TRO violations. In an amicus brief filed in
117. 443 U.S. at 64 n.11.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. See Interview by Mike Wallace with Jessica Gonzales, supra note 3
(demonstrating that Ms. Gonzales expected the TRO to protect her daughters).
120. See supra Part II.B (expounding on how the plain meaning of the term “shall”
and the legislative history of section 18-6-803.5 leads to the conclusion that the
Colorado Code requires mandatory TRO enforcement).
121. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2823 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that if Gonzales “had contracted with a private security firm to
provide her and her daughters with protection from her husband, it would be
apparent that she possessed a property interest in such a contract,” and arguing that
the state of Colorado undertook a similar obligation by providing her with a TRO).
122. See ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Castle Rock v. Gonzales: Making the
Court’s Protection Real, WOMEN’S RIGHTS, March 17, 2005, available at
http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/gen/13212res20050317.html (last visited July
20, 2006) (expressing Ms. Gonzales’ belief that the police would arrest Mr. Gonzales
if he violated the TRO). In this interview, conducted shortly before the Supreme
Court heard her case, Ms. Gonzales stated that if the Supreme Court ruled that there
was no mandatory enforcement of TROs, the issuance of a TRO would be
“meaningless.” Id.; cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189, 209 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (maintaining that a private citizen “would doubtless feel that her job
was done as soon as she had reported her suspicions of child abuse to [the
Department of Social Services]”). See generally Mary Kate Kearney, DeShaney’s Legacy
in Foster Care and Public School Settings, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 296-97 (2002)
(underscoring that when the state “effectively confined” a child to a life-threatening
situation, it had “functional custody” over the child sufficient to create a special
relationship requiring state protection).
123. See NBPA Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 12 (demonstrating how police
officers understand their duty to enforce TROs).
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support of Ms. Gonzales, the National Black Police Association
(NBPA) and other law enforcement agencies maintained that current
police practices exceed what sections 14-10-108(2)(b)-(c) and 18-6124
803.5(3) require.
The NBPA Amicus Brief cites the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Model Policy, which requires
125
Thus, even if police have
police to ensure the safety of children.
the option to determine whether or not to make an arrest, they do
126
not have discretion about whether or not to protect children.
Absence of discretion supports interpreting section 18-6-803.5(3) as
127
mandating TRO enforcement.
Therefore, since Mr. Gonzales
abducted the girls and their well-being was uncertain, the police
should have responded to Ms. Gonzales’ repeated pleas for help.
D. The Rights/Remedies Framework Explains Gonzales
The Court’s failure to recognize Ms. Gonzales’ property interest
marks a shift in the Court’s analysis of procedural due process. The
Court’s concern with remedies, specifically the practical impact of
limiting police discretion, explains this shift. The Court pointed to
the “practical necessity for discretion” as evidence that the Colorado
128
Legislature did not intend for the statute to be mandatory. Further,
even though a “presumption of deference [is] given [to] the views of
129
a federal court as to the law of a State within its jurisdiction,” the
Court chose to ignore this presumption because of its remedial
130
concerns. As discussed above, however, this finding of discretionary
intent is not supported by the legislative history surrounding the
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id. (citing Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Model Policy (rev. 1997)).
126. But see DAVIS, supra note 108, at 90-93 (arguing that although police officers
would never acknowledge that they selectively enforce criminal statutes, in reality,
police officers have this discretion). Davis asserts that this leads to the enforcement
of the most sensible system. See id. at 93 (discussing the nonenforcement of many
minor legal violations and concluding that “[a]lmost all legislators are fully aware
that the system would not be sensible if every criminal statute were enforced
according to its letter”).
127. See id. at 95 (arguing that when a legislature makes its intention for full
enforcement clear in a statute, “its general acquiescence in nonenforcement and its
appropriation of less than enough for full enforcement may be overridden by the
more specific intent”).
128. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2806 (2005); cf. SCALIA,
supra note 46, at 16-17 (asserting that “the intent of the legislature” is best discerned
from the text of the law as opposed to the legislative history which involves a “great
degree of confusion”). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479-82 (1987) (providing an overview of
different methods of statutory interpretation).
129. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2804 (quoting Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524
U.S. 156, 167 (1998)) (first alteration in original).
130. See id. at 2810 (emphasizing the Court’s “continuing reluctance to treat the
Fourteenth Amendment as ‘a font of tort law’” (quotation omitted)).
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131

enactment of section 18-6-803.5(3). Perhaps more significantly, the
Court dismissed the plain language of the statute, pointing to the
“deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion” to dismiss
132
“seemingly mandatory legislative commands.”
The Court’s
departure from reliance on the text of the statute is in sharp contrast
133
Finally, the Court explained that
with the Court’s past approach.
the Colorado Legislature’s use of the term “shall” was not enough to
indicate mandatory enforcement; instead, the Court explained that
the Legislature had to use “some stronger indication” than
134
mandatory language to indicate mandatory intent. On what would
135
qualify as “some stronger indication,” however, the Court is silent.
The Court argued that even if the Colorado Legislature intended
to make enforcement mandatory, this would not guarantee Ms.
136
Gonzales “enforcement of the mandate.” The Court emphasized that
“legislative history, insufficient resources, and sheer physical
impossibility” may require courts to reject literal interpretation of
137
statutes.
Thus, the Court values the well-established tradition of
138
police discretion over the mandatory language within the statute.
131. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the legislative history of section 18-6-803.5,
and concluding that the legislature intended to require mandatory TRO
enforcement).
132. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2805-06; see also New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 654, 655 (1995) (looking to
the structure and purpose of the Act in question after considering its text); cf. Larry
J. Pittman, The Federal Aviation Act:
The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory
Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 855-56 (2002)
(arguing that if a federal court does not defer to the state court’s decision to allow
arbitration, the impermissible outcome of different forums leading to different
outcomes will result). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 64 (1994) (arguing that the text
of a statute should carry much greater weight than legislative history and intent).
133. Compare Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2805-06 (writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
maintains that to rely solely on the plain text would violate common sense), with
SCALIA, supra note 46, at 22 (asserting that the text of the statute is law and failure to
follow it leads to an outcome that is inherently wrong).
134. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2806.
135. Before Gonzales, the term “shall” was sufficient to indicate mandatory intent.
Thus, there is no guidance about what would meet this new standard for
demonstrating mandatory intent. Professor Christopher J. Roederer criticizes the
Court’s assertion that the Colorado Legislature should use stronger language
because “it is hard to imagine clearer language that is not silly (e.g. ‘really shall’,
‘must use all means regardless of how reasonable’).” Roederer, supra note 109, at
109. See generally Martin H. Redish, Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1979: Text,
Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633,
1640 (1990) (stressing that there is no logical way to interpret “shall” as not
mandatory).
136. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2808.
137. Id. at 2806 (quoting 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1-405, comments
1-124 to 1-125 (2d ed. 1980)).
138. See id. (discussing the deep-rooted nature of police discretion). The Court
also suggests that mandatory intent only attaches when a public end is affected. Id. at
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By limiting recognition of mandatory intent to criminal matters
affecting a public end, the Supreme Court has severely limited the
relief available for private concerns.
Leading up to Gonzales, the Court increasingly used remedies
139
language in its decisions. In DeShaney v. Winnebago, the Court
140
The Court
refused to impose affirmative duties on state actors.
asserted that “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause
itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
141
citizens against invasion by private actors.”
Rather, “the Due
Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental
aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
142
individual.”
The Court stressed its concern over the impact that
placing affirmative duties would have on state actors, representing a
143
Similarly, the
remedial, rather than a rights-based consideration.
Gonzales Court’s discussion of police discretion, and hesitation in
taking away such discretion, demonstrates its concern with imposing
144
affirmative duties on state actors.

2808 (“The serving of public rather than private ends is the normal course of the
criminal law because criminal acts, ‘besides the injury [they do] to individuals, . . .
strike at the very being of society . . . .’” (quoting 4. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1769)) (alteration in original)); see also Gonzales v.
Town of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1105 (10th Cir. 2004) (“While an officer must
obviously exercise some judgment in determining the existence of probable cause,
the validity and accuracy of that decision is reviewed under objectively ascertainable
standards and judged by what a reasonably well-trained officer would know.”);
United States v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1999) (maintaining that courts
should determine the reasonableness of police response based on how the
circumstances would have appeared to a prudent, cautious, and well-trained police
officer).
139. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
140. Id. at 197-98; see also Mattis, supra note 57, at 530-31 (asserting that the Tenth
Circuit dismissed Ms. Gonzales’ substantive due process claim because of DeShaney);
Peter Edelman, Another Casualty of Judicial Callousness, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999, at
18 (describing DeShaney as “outrageous” and lamenting the arbitrary distinction
between the case at bar and what would constitute being in state “custody”).
141. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
142. Id. at 196.
143. Id.
144. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2806 (2005) (“They
clearly do not mean that a police officer may not lawfully decline to make an arrest.
As to third parties in these states, the full-enforcement statutes simply have no effect,
and their significance is further diminished.” (quoting 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1-405, comments 1-124 to 1-125 (2d ed. 1980)). Gonzales was heard
solely on procedural due process grounds because the precedent from DeShaney
caused the Tenth Circuit to quickly dismiss the substantive due process claim. The
Tenth Circuit opinion explains that the Supreme Court had already established that
“the Constitution itself does not require a state to protect its citizens from third party
harm.” Gonzales v. Town of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1099 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Allowing police discretion as to whether or not to enforce criminal
145
By emphasizing the
statutes negates mandatory enforcement.
“tradition of police discretion,” the Gonzales Court avoided placing an
146
affirmative duty on state officials to enforce TROs.
Rather than
looking to the plain language of the statute or drawing upon the
legislative history for its interpretation, the majority focused on the
147
impact its decision would have on police.
As a result, the Gonzales
ruling reflects a policy decision by the Court to bar relief to a plaintiff
whose constitutionally guaranteed rights were violated, in order to
shield state actors from liability.
III. GONZALES’ IMPACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOVING
FORWARD
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzales has significant
implications. The Supreme Court’s shifting jurisprudence impairs
148
legislatures’ ability to enact effective legislation. It also restricts the
protection that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides to private citizens when
149
In addition, Gonzales has grave
state laws fail to protect them.
150
public policy implications for victims of domestic violence.
Therefore, this Comment concludes that the Supreme Court
should have granted Ms. Gonzales postdeprivation relief. Courts
145. See DAVIS, supra note 108, at 90-92 (commenting that police non-enforcement
of criminal statutes and ordinances changes the law as intended by legislators). Davis
asserts that while police non-enforcement allows police to change the law, something
that police are uncomfortable about doing openly, this is necessary to strike the right
balance between the law and reality. Id. at 93. In the reverse, Davis’ reasoning
indicates that allowing police officers discretion in applying mandatory enforcement
statutes, changes the law and impermissibly allows police to frustrate the legislature’s
intent. Id.
146. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2805-06. See generally Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct.
2796 (2005) (No. 04-278) at 10 (expressing concerns about the policy implications of
“unwarranted liability” imposed on state actors).
147. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2806; cf. Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal
Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2416-18
(2003) (highlighting the potential for arbitrary application of laws when police are
given discretion).
148. Compare MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
174 (1999) (discussing the effect of shifting Supreme Court jurisprudence while
arguing that judicial review allows political leaders to abrogate difficult decisions to
the judiciary), with Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review?,
98 MICH. L. REV. 1416, 1421 (2000) (arguing that Tushnet’s analysis greatly overstates
the problems associated with judicial review).
149. See Mattis, supra note 57, at 525 (describing the potential for procedural due
process remedies for victims of state inaction prior to Gonzales).
150. See generally G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled From the Province of Care:
Domestic
Violence, Duty, and Conceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111 (2005)
(arguing that public policy considerations require state accountability for nonintervention in the face of mandatory arrest statutes).
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should hold police and other state actors responsible for not
following procedures and uphold the relief provided by state
legislation. Even if Colorado’s statute opened up municipalities to
too much liability, it is the responsibility of the Legislature to amend
the statute. The Supreme Court overreached its rights-determining
role in ignoring the intent of the Colorado Legislature.
A. Gonzales Reduces Legislatures’ Ability to Protect Citizens
The Gonzales decision takes away the core function of state and
local legislatures to accomplish what they deem necessary to protect
their citizens, even where there is no violation of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, pursuant to its judicial review powers, can
151
overturn unconstitutional state legislation. However, many experts
question the Court’s overreaching application of this power. Justice
Breyer cautions the Court from overreaching, noting that “within the
bounds of the rational, Congress, not the courts, must remain
primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal
152
balance.”
Justice Breyer also criticizes the Court’s increased
willingness to overturn state legislation, even where there is clear
153
legislative intent.
While the Court did not expressly invalidate section 18-6-805.5(3)
of the Colorado Code, Gonzales eliminated the Legislature’s intent for
mandatory enforcement. As police are not required to enforce
154
TROs, many fear that the orders are now useless.
Accordingly,
151. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (providing the
historical basis for judicial review). See generally Charles F. Hobson, Commentary, The
Origins of Judicial Review: A Historian’s Explanation, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811, 815
(1999) (tracing the origins of judicial review back before the Marshall Court to the
disarray of state legislative enactments in the post-revolutionary period and
Madison’s response in the Federalist papers); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial
Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
787, 788-89 (1999) (contending that the Supreme Court did not cite Marbury as the
origin of judicial review until the late nineteenth century).
152. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 660 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that practical realities justified the enactment of the civil remedy section of
the Violence Against Women Act and the majority erred by striking that section
down); see also id. at 647 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s “rejection
of the Founders’ considered judgment that politics, not judicial review, should
mediate between state and national interests”).
153. See BREYER, supra note 19, at 109-11 (arguing that judges should be
constrained by the constitutional objective of active democratic participation and
contending that conservative justices vote to strike down state statutes more
frequently than liberal judges).
154. See, e.g., Roederer, supra note 109, at 118 (concluding that Gonzales allows
police officers to arbitrarily ignore their duty to enforce TROs at the expense of the
most vulnerable members of society); Maria Gonzales & Tamara Koehler, Challenge
May Alter Domestic Violence Strategies, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Mar. 27, 2005, at 1
(interviewing Sandra Saucedo from the Coalition to End Family Violence in Oxnard,
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Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Gonzales emphasizes how the
majority overstepped its role in deciding a state-law issue and strayed
155
from the “tradition of judicial restraint.”
As the rights/remedies framework explains, legislatures are best
situated to consider the impact of their legislation, and courts are
156
better situated to consider whether such legislation violates a right.
Some scholars warn that serious consequences arise when courts
157
overstep their rights-determining role.
Courts enter the realm of
deciding public policy, rather than properly interpreting and
158
applying the law. If the judiciary continues in this direction, it can
interpret what is mandatory as “not mandatory” at will, without any
159
This is
checks from the other branches of government.
inappropriate because it allows courts too much power and takes
away from the proper role of legislatures to balance public opinion
160
with the protection of rights.
This will leave many, like Ms.
161
Gonzales, with no relief.

CA, who asserts that protective orders are often the only thing protecting a victim of
domestic violence from further abuse).
155. 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2814 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. See McConnell, supra note 30, at 170-71 (suggesting that although the
judiciary holds exclusive authority to interpret the extent of constitutionally
protected rights, Congress must also interpret the Constitution to enact legislation
that does not curtail judicially-determined rights). See generally Stephen L. Carter,
The Morgan “Power” and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 819, 824 (1986) (arguing that when Congress follows its proper role of
enacting legislation, this necessarily creates a dialogue with the Court regarding
fundamental rights).
157. See id. at 881 (expressing concern about the impact of the Court’s remedial
intrusiveness on federalism, and about the expansion of judicial “policymaking”).
But see, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society–Judicial
Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (1968) (maintaining that the Court is
best suited to preserve community values). See generally Judge Rosemary Barkett, The
Tyranny of Labels, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 749, 756-57 (2005) (pointing out the
ambiguous definition of “judicial activism” which is a catch-all phrase for “bad”
judging).
158. See Levinson, supra note 28, at 865 (“Developing remedies is a routine matter
of making politically influenced policy judgments about the means of achieving the
constitutionally anointed ends.”).
159. See id. at 914 (emphasizing that the ideal role for the Court is to “tak[e]
advantage of [its] insulation from majoritarian pressure to engage in principled
constitutional interpretation”).
160. See supra Part I (expounding on the proper role of the courts and legislature
within the understanding of the rights/remedies framework).
161. See, e.g., M. Ratcliff, Court Contender Takes Judicial-Activism Prize, VENTURA
COUNTY STAR, Sept. 25, 2005, at 10 (using Judge Janice Rogers Brown as an example
of a recently confirmed conservative judge who is “an unrestrained judicial activist”
for “legally unsupportable” assaults on precedent and clear legislative intent). But see
Saikrishna Prakash, Are the Judicial Safeguards of Federalism the Ultimate Form of
Conservative Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2002) (asserting that
because the Constitution implicitly provides for judicial review, criticisms of judicial
activism are unfounded).
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Finally, even if the Supreme Court had held the Town of Castle
Rock liable, it is the legislature’s role to determine whether there is
an unacceptable level of liability for state actors. If this is the case,
the Legislature should amend section 18-6-805.5(3) to create more
162
discretion or shield police from liability. Moreover, it is beyond the
Court’s function to address its concern about exposing state actors to
too much liability. Gonzales demonstrates the Court’s unwillingness
to trust legislatures to control the impact of their own legislation.
B. Gonzales Restricts the Purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Gonzales also has important
implications for other 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Cases asking the
Supreme Court to find a property entitlement interest are brought
under § 1983 because it allows citizens to sue state actors for
163
deprivation of a protected right.
Section 1983 opens the door for
liability where a state actor “subjects . . . any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
164
secured by the Constitution and laws.”
In denying Ms. Gonzales
relief, the Supreme Court severely limited the ability of § 1983 to
protect private citizens.
Though the Supreme Court rarely considered § 1983 during the
165
first fifty years after Congress enacted it, this changed as the Court
extended the Bill of Rights to the states and recognized more rights

162. See Norton v. Taxing Dist. of Brownsville, 129 U.S. 479, 489 (1889) (asserting
that municipalities are bound by statutes until the legislature amends them to
expand their powers); see also Leslye E. Orloff & Janice V. Kaguyutan, Offering a
Helping Hand: Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant Women: A History of Legislative
Responses, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 95, 168-70 (2002) (positing that
amendments are necessary to expand the reaches of VAWA’s protection of battered
immigrant women and children).
163. Section 1983 defines “state actors” as either state employees, or municipalities
themselves. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978) (stating that § 1983 allows for a cause of action against municipal and local
governments, among others). Accordingly, Ms. Gonzales sued both the Town of
Castle Rock and three officers of the Castle Rock police department in the U.S.
District Court of Colorado. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2802
n.3 (2005). The individual officers were granted qualified immunity, and the district
court dismissed the action against the town for failure to state a claim based on
either substantive or procedural due process grounds because Ms. Gonzales did not
establish municipal liability. Id.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
165. See A SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ANTHOLOGY 3 (Sheldon H. Nahmod ed.,
1993) (explaining that § 1983 was used rarely before Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961)). See generally Eric H. Zagrans, “Under Color of” What Law: A Reconstructed
Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 540-60 (1985) (offering a thorough
overview of § 1983’s legislative history).
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166

for individuals.
Immediately following this incorporation, the
Court began considering § 1983 claims against state and local officials
167
Subsequently, however, the Court’s
for constitutional violations.
168
concern with remedies impacted its willingness to apply § 1983. In
169
Martinez v. California, the Court indicated that states may not be
required to hear § 1983 cases involving state sovereign immunity
170
arising from state laws.
The Court argued that allowing judicial
review over parole board decisions would impede parole officers in
171
their decision-making. Thus, remedial concerns drove the Court’s
172
decision.
166. E.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643 (1882) (stressing that despite
Congress’s intent that § 1983 provide citizens relief when treated unconstitutionally
by state actors, § 1983 did not extend to protection against unconstitutional acts by
private actors).
167. See Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1988) (Aldisert, J.,
concurring), vacated, 493 U.S. 801 (1989) (recognizing that since Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), § 1983 “has been successfully utilized to correct tens of thousands of
civil rights violations . . . [it] has been a major force in protecting the individual from
countless abuses by the city, county, and state”). See generally Harry A. Blackmun,
Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights–Will the Statute Remain Alive or
Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1985) (addressing critics of § 1983 and
arguing that it continues to be necessary to protect federal rights); 1 MARTIN A.
SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES
13 (2d ed. 1991) (highlighting how many scholars “see the expanded use of section
1983 as a healthy development”).
168. See generally Megan Grill, Comment, Walking the Line: The Rehnquist Court’s
Reverence For Federalism and Official Discretion in DeShaney and Castle Rock, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 487, 496-98 (2006) (highlighting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), as
evidence of the Supreme Court’s fear of being overwhelmed by § 1983 claims); David
Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. 1983
and the Debate Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2186 (2005) (noting
that the Court has struggled since § 1983 was passed to decide when municipalities
are liable for the acts of their employees and officials); Laura Oren, Safari Into the
Snake Pit: The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1139, 1189-90
(2005) (differentiating between ordinary tort claims and state-created danger cases).
The factors courts consider in state-created danger cases are:
(1) Did state officials exercise authority or power; (2) in such a way that they
put someone in a worse position than they would otherwise have occupied;
(3) risking and causing a significant harm; (4) with a degree of culpability
(which might be deliberate indifference) amounting to conscience-shocking
behavior in the factual context?
Id. (emphasis omitted).
169. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
170. Id. at 280-83. The Court concluded that the state and the parole board could
not have predicted any special danger to the decedent when releasing the decedent’s
killer. Id. at 285. Thus, the state’s actions were, under the circumstances, too remote
from the harm. Id.; cf. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989)
(distinguishing between remote state action and deliberate indifference to an
individual’s safety).
171. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 282-83.
172. Compare Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279 (2002) (suggesting that
§ 1983 is not applicable to Spending Clause statutes due to insufficient means for
enforcement), with Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying
the Seeds of a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1839-40

YUEN.OFFTOPRINTER

1872

8/12/2006 2:15:46 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1843

173

In Monroe v. Pape, the Court extended § 1983 liability to situations
where an individual acts according to his state capacity, even if the
174
The Court asserted that
action was not authorized by state law.
state actors are liable when: (1) the defendant acts “under color of”
state law, and (2) the defendant’s action deprives the plaintiff of
some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
175
federal statute.
The Court specified that though Monroe was an
instance in which police and city officials acted to deprive citizens of
their rights, the same analysis applies to situations in which the state
176
177
fails to act to protect citizens.
In Blessing v. Freestone, the Court
clarified that § 1983 applies when (1) legislative intent provides the
plaintiff with the benefit, (2) the asserted right is not “vague and
amorphous,” and (3) the claim concerns a right arising from a
178
binding obligation on the states.
Ms. Gonzales’ claim satisfied all
three of these requirements. The Colorado Legislature intended to
create a property interest in TRO enforcement, the right was not
179
vague or amorphous, and the right was meant to be binding. The
Court’s ruling, therefore, undermines the intent of § 1983 to make
180
state actors personally liable for their official actions.
C. The Public Policy Implications of Gonzales
Gonzales also creates considerable concern because of its public
181
policy implications. Domestic violence is the number one cause of
(2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s rejection of § 1983 as a mechanism to
enforce Spending Clause provisions should not restrict other means of enforcing the
Spending Clause).
173. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 179-80, 184, 211.
176. Id. at 258 n.87; see also Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing the
Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 661, 662 (1997)
(recognizing that Monroe began an increase in § 1983 claims).
177. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
178. Id. at 340-41.
179. See supra Part III.A (analyzing Gonzales’ impact on legislatures’ ability to
protect citizens).
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (holding individuals liable for their actions
committed in an official capacity); see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380 (1990)
(rejecting the proposition that a state court could refuse to hear a § 1983 claim on
the grounds of state sovereign immunity by asserting that “[a] State may not . . .
relieve congestion in its courts by declaring a whole category of federal claims to be
frivolous”). See generally Breadan Marshall Douthett, The Death of Constitutional Duty
The Court Reacts to the Expansion of Section 1983 Liability in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 643, 650 (1991) (lamenting
how DeShaney “calls into question the legitimacy and logic of a nation governed by a
bureaucracy which has no constitutional duties towards its citizens unless they are in
captivity”).
181. See, e.g., Gonzales Ruling a “Serious Blow” to Victims of Violence Who Need Police
Protection, FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND NEWS FLASH (National Center on
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injury to women, and police protection is critical to protecting
182
Experts believe that women are
battered women and children.
hesitant to seek police protection and will do so only if they believe
183
that the police in fact will protect them. Moreover, women of color,
like Ms. Gonzales, are the least likely group to seek police
184
Thus, the
intervention because of a cultural distrust of police.
Gonzales decision expands an already large barrier preventing abused
185
women from seeking police protection from their batterers.
Domestic violence advocates, who have spent years convincing abused
women to come forward for protection, can no longer guarantee that
186
the state has a duty to protect women from their abusers.
Domestic and Sexual Violence, Austin, TX), June 27, 2005, available at
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/GonzalesRulingSeriousBlow.pdf
(lamenting
the
Gonzales ruling as a “serious blow to victims of domestic violence who count on local
police to protect them and their children”).
182. See THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, THE CENTER
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FACT SHEET, http://www.cdc.
gov/ncipc/factsheets/ipvfacts.htm (last visited July 20, 2006) (reporting that there
were nearly 5.3 million instances of Intimate Partner Violence against women, and
3.2 million instances against men in 2000); Callie Marie Rennison, Intimate Partner
Violence, 1993-2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Feb.
2003, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (stating that despite a
downward trend in instances of intimate partner violence, there were still an
alarming 691,710 instances of intimate partner violence in 2001, with eighty-five
percent of those instances being against women).
183. See Chiu, supra note 19, at 1227-29 (noting the hesitancy of battered women
to involve police in their domestic disputes); see also Deborah Epstein, Effective
Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the
Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 4 (1999) (linking the lack of law enforcement
response to reports of domestic violence to an deep ambivalence about the issue).
184. See id. at 1250 (“There is also a more generalized community ethic against
public intervention, the product of a desire to create a private world free from the
diverse assaults on the public lives of racially subordinated people. The home is not
simply a man’s castle in the patriarchal sense, but may also function as a safe haven
from the indignities of life in a racist society. However, but for this ‘safe haven’ in
many cases, women of color victimized by violence might otherwise seek help”)
(quoting Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: InterSectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991)); see also Mary
Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Service Needs of
Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 245, 271-81 (2000) (demonstrating the numerous barriers for battered
immigrant women to leave abusive relationships).
185. See Kathleen K. Curtis, Comment, The Supreme Court’s Attack on Domestic
Violence Legislation—Discretion, Entitlement, and Due Process In Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1181, 1207-14 (2006) (focusing on Gonzales’
impact on domestic violence statutes).
186. See Kneipp v. Teddler, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that
intervention by city officials increased the risk of danger to the victim by their
reassurances, and subsequent failure, to ensure her safety); accord Proclamation No.
7601, 3 C.F.R. § 142 (2002), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2003/
3CFR7601.htm (declaring that “[m]any abusers become more dangerous after courtenforced separation from their victims and often use visitation or exchange of
children as an opportunity to inflict abuse” in the proclamation of National
Domestic Violence Awareness Month).
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Moreover, by deciding that police need not enforce protection
orders, the Court endangers other vulnerable members of society
who depend on restraining orders. Victims are now more likely to
seek private methods of protection because they cannot rely on the
187
state to protect them.
Thus, the poor who cannot afford private
188
Additionally, senior
security will be left especially vulnerable.
citizens, who are the “truly forgotten victims of domestic violence,”
will be affected disproportionately by discretionary enforcement of
189
restraining orders.
As the Supreme Court has removed what is often a domestic
violence victim’s last hope for protection, the state’s overall burden
for protecting citizens will increase. DeShaney suggests that state
190
responsibility exists only in cases of physical custody.
Therefore,
victims may seek custodial situations for protection even where a less
191
In addition, citizens may be
extreme solution may be available.
more likely to seek private actions through tort remedies against

187. See generally Robert L. Barrow, Note, Women with Attitude: Self Protection, Policy,
and the Law, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 59, 63 (1999) (maintaining that as women are
often targets of criminal violence, and since the state has no duty to protect an
individual citizen, self-protection and right to carry laws are necessary for greater
public safety).
188. See National Network Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 28-29 (recounting a 2002
Department of Justice study that showed that domestic violence victims did not
believe protective orders were effective because they were not enforced).
189. See AARP Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 4:
[Elder Abuse is defined as] at least one of the following acts or omissions:
(1) an intentional act or attempt to inflict physical harm by anyone, or
psychological harm by a caretaker; (2) non-consensual sexual contact;
(3) failure by a caretaker to provide for satisfying a persons’ basic life needs;
i.e. food, care, housing, medical attention, or other necessities; and,
(4) illegal or inappropriate use or taking of an individual’s assets or
properties.
190. See 489 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1989) (suggesting that state actors will be held
responsible where a “special relationship,” generally involving physical custody,
exists). Compare Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d
Cir. 1985) (finding a state duty to protect where the state was aware of a “special
danger,” even though the state did not have actual physical custody of the victim),
with Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1984) (dismissing victims’
claims upon finding that no federal case clearly established an affirmative state duty
to protect battered children, and upon finding that the social service officials acted
in good faith thus warranting immunity). See generally Stephen Faberman, Note, The
Lessons of DeShaney: Special Relationships, Schools & The Fifth Circuit, 35 B.C. L. REV.
97, 136-37 (1993) (suggesting that the impracticability of requiring “special
relationships” to protect children in a school setting requires a less rigid, fact-specific
standard).
191. See Peter Edelman, Another Casualty of Judicial Callousness, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
20, 1999, at 18 (describing the DeShaney opinion as “outrageous” and lamenting the
arbitrary distinction between the facts of DeShaney and what would constitute state
“custody”). See generally Oren, supra note 168, at 1190 (concluding that the Supreme
Court has made it unnecessarily difficult for victims to establish state-created
dangers).
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192

government actors.
Overall, the Gonzales decision leaves the most
vulnerable citizens at greater risk and encourages them to carry out
acts that trained police officers are better suited to perform.
D. A Postdeprivation Remedy for Ms. Gonzales
Ms. Gonzales and other advocates wanted the Supreme Court to
hold Castle Rock police accountable for not following the procedures
193
required by Section 18-6-805.5(3) of the Colorado Code.
In
Gonzales, there was substantial evidence that would lead a reasonable
194
police officer to believe Mr. Gonzales violated the TRO. The police
officers had affirmative knowledge that Mr. Gonzales had the girls,
knowledge of his location, and Ms. Gonzales’ called them repeatedly
195
over six hours.
Moreover, the Colorado court granted the TRO
initially because it believed that Mr. Gonzales posed an imminent
196
danger to Ms. Gonzales and her daughters.
Therefore, the police
officers’ unwillingness to take any action fell short of the standard
197
response of a reasonably well-trained officer.
The Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids deprivation of
property without “due process of law,” would have granted Ms.
Gonzales a cause of action had the Court properly recognized Ms.
198
Gonzales’ property interest in the TRO’s enforcement.
In Goss v.
192. See Curtis, supra note 185, at 1213 (suggesting that state legislatures could
grant victims of governmental negligence relief). Unlike Colorado that immunizes
the government from common law tort liability, Minnesota leaves the government
open to full common law tort liability. Id. Also, Curtis suggests that the Supreme
Court should develop a statutory remedy to protect citizens when police fail to
enforce restraining orders. Id.
193. See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Urges Supreme
Court to Hold Police Accountable for Enforcing Restraining Orders (Mar. 21, 2005),
available at http://www.aclu.org/court/court.cfm?ID=17778&c=286 (announcing
that the ACLU coordinated nine Amicus Briefs in support of Ms. Gonzales that were
signed by a total of 113 organizations, two former federal judges, and a former
Colorado state representative).
194. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (presenting the facts of Ms. Gonzales’
claim); cf. Stacey v. Emory, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878) (explaining that facts and
circumstances are judged from the perspective of a “man of prudence and caution”
to ascertain if an offense has been committed); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925) (looking for “reasonably trustworthy information” to justify police action
of search and seizure).
195. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the officers’ inaction
despite the repeated requests for help from Ms. Gonzales in the face of clear
danger).
196. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102(4)(a) (1999) (“A temporary civil protection
order may be issued if the issuing judge or magistrate finds that an imminent danger
exists to the person or persons seeking protection under the civil protection order”)
(emphasis added).
197. Cf. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161-62 (noting that an officer’s good faith efforts must
be based on an objectively reasonable understanding of the facts).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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199

Lopez, the Court clarified that sufficient procedural due process for
property deprivation occurs when the state affords a citizen “some
200
“Some kind of notice”
kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing.”
and “some kind of hearing” does not place the burden on police to
201
protect every victim.
Rather, notice is satisfied where the police
sufficiently follow standard procedures for responding to a TRO
202
violation.
Therefore, as soon as Ms. Gonzales confirmed Mr.
Gonzales’ violation of the TRO, the police should have located him
203
Later, they could have applied
and taken him into custody.
discretion as to whether to file a motion of contempt against Mr.
204
Gonzales.
As such, the Court failed to protect Ms. Gonzales’
procedural due process rights.
Since Colorado police failed to follow proper TRO enforcement
205
procedures,
the Court should have granted Ms. Gonzales
206
postdeprivation relief. In Parratt v. Taylor, the Court recognized
that postdeprivation relief could be required of states in instances of
207
due process violations. Though the Court has not given a clear or
199. 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (emphasis added).
200. See id. at 579 (qualifying that the Court would consider “appropriate
accommodation of the competing interests involved”); accord Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 542 (1971) (asserting that procedure is satisfied when there is “notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”) (citations omitted).
Only in rare circumstances is no hearing required to satisfy the requirements of due
process. See, e.g., Cent. Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1921) (time of
war); Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572, 584 (1913) (protection of public health).
201. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 579-82 (holding that, although most students subject to
suspension are entitled to a hearing, special cases might justify the removal of
students without traditional procedures); cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 179
(1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“While these cases
indicate that the particular interests involved might not have demanded a hearing
immediately, they also reaffirm the principle that property may not be taken without
a hearing at some time.”).
202. See, e.g., NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON POLICE
RESPONSE PROCEDURES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 11-12 (1994), http://www.state.nj
.us/lps/dcj/agguide/3dvpolrs.pdf (requiring police to arrest the suspect, sign a
criminal contempt charge concerning the incident, communicate with a judge or
bail unit to set bail for the contempt charge, and if the defendant is unable to post
bail, arrange for the defendant’s incarceration).
203. See COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT COUNTY
COURT RESTRAINING ORDERS 5 (June 2002), http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/
pubed/brochures/restraining.pdf (advising victims to call the police if the defendant
violates any part of the restraining order, as the police are required to arrest the
defendant if they have probable cause to believe the restraining order was violated).
204. Id. (providing that if police choose not to file a motion for contempt, the
victim may do so).
205. See supra note 200 (stating that arrests are mandatory for violations of
restraining orders).
206. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
207. See id. at 538-39, 543 (1981) (articulating that a prisoner defendant would not
receive relief because the state’s tort system provided sufficient remedies). The
Court, however, did not specify what the postdeprivation remedy would be in that
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consistent formulation of what constitutes sufficient postdeprivation
208
Thus, given
relief, it has deferred to established state procedures.
Colorado state law, the Castle Rock police department should have
sanctioned the individual officers named by Ms. Gonzales, and the
state should have granted Ms. Gonzales compensation for her loss.
Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales, states seeking to
provide greater protections for victims of domestic violence should
209
not focus exclusively on enacting mandatory enforcement statutes.
Rather, they should promote greater cooperation between law
210
enforcement and domestic violence social service providers.
Collaborative efforts will hold police accountable through public
pressure and awareness. Over time, strong collaboration will help
domestic violence victims and advocates learn to trust that police will
211
do the right thing, which will then encourage victims to seek help.
As police are trained by domestic violence advocates to better identify
well-founded fears and legitimate complaints, the overall effectiveness

case because it held that the defendant failed to state a valid claim against the state
for losing the $23.50 hobby kit he had ordered. Id. at 543-44; see also Phillips v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931) (“Where only property
rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due
process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of liability is
adequate.”). But cf. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 100-01 (1984) (criticizing the majority opinion in
Parratt for applying a due process analysis).
208. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537-38 (listing examples of when the Court has upheld
remedies granted by states); see also Frederick S. Schwartz, The Postdeprivation Remedy
Doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor and Its Application to Cases of Land Use Regulation, 21 GA. L.
REV. 601, 616-17 (1987) (discussing the complexities of determining when
postdeprivation remedies should be granted, and how they are determined); cf.
Patricia C. Cecil, Note, Section 1983 and State Postdeprivation Remedy for Liberty Loss:
Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985), 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 257, 269 (1986)
(summarizing the need for separate postdeprivation analysis for liberty and property
claims because while property “can be returned or . . . compensated for monetarily,”
liberty cannot).
209. Cf. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1730 (2004) (contending that
mandatory statutes are necessary for promoting the long-term safety of battered
women). Sack maintains, in an article written before Gonzales, that mandatory
policies will reduce batterers’ ability to manipulate the justice system, create an
ongoing collaboration among diverse community groups, and increase
understanding about domestic violence throughout the community. Id. at 1731.
210. See id. at 1675 (chronicling how necessity forced a partnership between
battered women’s advocates and law enforcement professionals); cf. Vera Institute of
Justice and Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice,
Building Strong Police-Immigrant Community Relations: Lessons from a New York City
Project (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item
=1576 (recognizing a project to strengthen relations between police and immigrants
in New York City to provide safer communities).
211. Cf. Sack, supra note 209, at 1675-76 (lamenting the strained relationship
between law enforcement and domestic violence advocates due to differing
priorities).
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of police departments and the safety of women and children will
improve.
In addition, states should bolster funding to address domestic
violence. Many women stay in abusive relationships because they fear
212
they will have no financial support if they leave.
Therefore, states
213
should increase financial assistance for domestic violence survivors.
This creates incentives for women to seek police involvement, even
though the state cannot require police to respond to TRO violations.
Finally, victims’ advocates must increase publicity about police
214
failure to enforce restraining orders.
Increased publicity will put
pressure on police to respond effectively to reports of TRO violations,
even if the law does not require them to do so. As police respond,
they will rebuild trust with the community, and women will find the
confidence to leave violent situations knowing that the police will
protect them.
CONCLUSION
In Gonzales, the Supreme Court’s departure from its traditional
analysis recognizing and protecting entitlement property interests left
Ms. Gonzales with no relief. The rights/remedies framework
provides a tool for understanding this departure. Specifically, the
Court overstepped its proper role of determining the extent and limit
of legal rights to addressing the remedial concerns arising from the
215
protection of rights.
Thus, the Court showed that it is willing to
shield states from liability, even when this requires ignoring a
212. See Peter Margolis, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New
Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1071, 1076 (1995) (emphasizing that lack of financial resources, affordable
housing, and welfare benefits may cause women to stay with an abusive partner);
Mary Becker, Social Responsibility for Lawyers: Access to Justice for Battered Women, 12
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 83 (2003) (highlighting the lack of options available for
women escaping domestic violence situations).
213. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 209, at 1734 (recommending that states increase
funding for legal assistance to domestic violence victims to encourage women to
leave abusive situations); Becker, supra note 212, at 88 (suggesting increased
resources for shelters, drug-treatment programs, education, and childcare as
important for fighting domestic violence).
214. See BREYER, supra note 19, at 127 (noting the influence of public criticism on
the judiciary). See generally OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND MINNESOTA
CENTER AGAINST VIOLENCE & ABUSE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RESOURCES, ASSESSING JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: A TOOL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTION AND THE COURTS TO
USE IN DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE RESPONSES (Feb. 1998), http://www.vaw.umn.edu/
documents/ promise/pplaw/pplaw.html (summarizing a wide range of options for
responding to violence against women).
215. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the Supreme
Court’s consideration of remedies is beyond its constitutionally prescribed role).
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statute’s plain language and clear legislative history. The Court’s
concern with the remedial impact of its decision explains why it failed
to recognize Ms. Gonzales’ property entitlement interest in TRO
enforcement.
Gonzales represents the Supreme Court expanding its judicial
review powers and exhibiting less and less restraint in overturning
both state and federal legislation. This trend creates significant
concerns as it reduces the ability of legislatures to protect their
citizens and renders 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ineffective in holding state
216
actors personally accountable for violating a private citizen’s rights.
Further, Gonzales leaves battered women, children, the poor, and the
elderly at risk with no assurance of police protection. Communities
and advocates must now exert stronger pressure on judges to prevent
courts from overstepping their judicial review powers. Communities
and advocates must also increase accountability for police through
non-legislative means and encourage increased funding for support
services to battered women. This will help victims of domestic
violence who rely on protection orders feel empowered to leave
violent situations and regain confidence that police will protect them.

216. See supra Part III.B (highlighting the impact of Gonzales on § 1983 litigation).

